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An online learning approach to dynamic pricing
for demand response
Liyan Jia, Lang Tong and Qing Zhao
Abstract—In this paper, the problem of optimal dynamic
pricing for retail electricity with an unknown demand model
is considered. Under the day-ahead dynamic pricing (a.k.a. real
time pricing) mechanism, a retailer obtains electricity in a two-
settlement wholesale market and serves its customers in real
time. Without knowledge on the aggregated demand function of
its customers, the retailer aims to maximize its retail surplus
by sequentially adjusting its price based on the behavior of its
customers in the past. An online learning algorithm, referred to as
piecewise linear stochastic approximation (PWLSA), is proposed.
It is shown that PWLSA achieves the optimal rate of learning
defined by the growth rate of cumulative regret. In particular, the
regret of PWLSA is shown to grow logarithmically with respect
to the learning horizon, and no other on-line learning algorithm
can have the growth rate slower than that of PWLSA. Simulation
studies are presented using traces of actual day-ahead prices, and
PWLSA compares favorably under both static and dynamically
changing parameters.
Index Terms—demand response; dynamic pricing; online
learning; stochastic approximation; optimal stochastic control.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a key feature of a future smart grid, demand response is
an effective way to improve power system operation efficiency,
hedge the risk of energy supply shortage, and enhance social
welfare. Based on characteristics of the interaction between a
retailer and its consumers, demand response can be classified
into two categories: demand responses with direct control and
ones with indirect control; the former refers to programs in
which the consumers enjoy lower electricity rate by allowing
the retailer to shed load in case of emergency. The latter refers
to approaches of influencing the consumers’ consumption
through dynamic pricing of electricity. In this paper, we focus
on the latter.
We assume that the retailer employs a real-time pricing
mechanism, referred to as day-ahead dynamic price (DADP),
under which the retailer posts the hourly prices of electricity
one day ahead. First proposed by Borenstein, Jaske, and
Rosenfield [1] and referred to as the real-time pricing (RTP),
DADP has been implemented in practice [1], [2]. A key
advantage of DADP is that a customer has the short-term price
certainty with which it can optimize its consumption.
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant
CNS-1135844 and CNS-1248079 and by the Army Research Office under
Grant W911NF-12-1-0271.
Liyan Jia and Lang Tong are with School of Electrical and Com-
puter Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA, 14850. Email:
{lj92,lt35}@cornell.edu.
Qing Zhao is with School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Univer-
sity of California, Davis, CA, USA, 95616. Email: qzhao@ucdavis.edu.
Part of this work was presented at the 51st Annual Allerton Conference on
Communication, Control, and Computing, Oct. 2013.
We assume that the retailer obtains electricity from a com-
monly adopted a two-settlement wholesale market, consisting
of a day-ahead market and real-time market. In the day-
ahead market, both the generators and retailers offer bids
for the next day. Based on the submitted bids, the system
operator schedules the day-ahead dispatch and clears the
market with the day-ahead price. In real-time operations, the
system operator adjusts the day-ahead dispatch according to
the actual operation condition and sends dispatch signal to
all participants to maintain the system balance. The amount
of electricity deviated from the day-ahead schedule is settled
according to the real-time price.
If the retailer knows how its customers respond to the retail
price through their individual demand functions, it can choose
the price to optimize a particular objective, e.g., the social
welfare or its own profit subject to regulations. Obtaining
the demand functions of its customers, however, is nontrivial
because a customer is likely to consider such information
private; neither the willingness of sharing nor the correctness
of the shared information can be assumed.
In this work, we focus on optimal dynamic pricing under
unknown demand functions. We take an online learning ap-
proach where the retailer learns the behavior of its customers
by observing their response to carefully designed prices. The
basic principle of online learning is to achieve a tradeoff be-
tween “exploration” and “exploitation;” the former represents
the need of using sufficiently rich pricing signals to achieve
learning accuracy, whereas the latter stands for the need of
capturing as much reward as possible based on what has been
learned.
In the classical online learning theory, the performance of
a learning algorithm is measured by the notion of cumulative
regret. For the pricing problem at hand, the regret is defined
as the difference between the retail surplus associated with the
actual aggregated demand function and the surplus achieved
by an online learning algorithm. While the cumulative regret
RT grows with the learning horizon T , the rate of growth,
RT /T , of a well designed on-line learning algorithm typi-
cally diminishes, which implies that, for the infinite horizon
problem, the profit achieved per unit time without knowing the
demand function matches that when the demand function is
known. Therefore, a relevant performance metric is the growth
rate of regret RT vs. T .
A. Summary of results
The basic problem setting involves two players: a retailer
(an electricity distributor or aggregator) who offers its cus-
tomer day-ahead hourly dynamic prices and its customers
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with price responsive demands. We focus on the case when
the customer demands are elastic and can be described by
a random affine model, which arises naturally for thermal
control applications.
The main result of this paper is twofold. First, under the
DADP mechanism, we propose a simple online learning algo-
rithm, referred to as piecewise linear stochastic approximation
(PWLSA), that has the logarithmic rate of growth in regret,
i.e. RT (T ) = Θ(logT ).
On the other hand, we show that no other on-line learning
algorithm can have the rate slower than that of PWLSA.
Thus PWLSA is order optimal. To achieve the optimal rate of
learning, we deviate the standard on-line learning approach by
first analyzing the mechanism of the two-settlement wholesale
electricity market and calculate the retail surplus of the retailer
as a wholesale market participant in a simple set-up. The result
shows that the retailer’s loss of surplus is proportional to the
2-norm deviation of the real-time consumption from the day-
ahead schedule.
To demonstrate the learning performance, we also conduct
simulations to compare PWLSA with the Greedy Method
based on the actual data. In both cases with static and dy-
namically changing parameters of the demand model, PWLSA
outperformed the greedy method and converged fast towards
the optimal price.
B. Related work
The problem of dynamic pricing for demand response as-
suming known demand functions has been extensively studied.
See, for example, [1], [3], [2], which adopted a similar pricing
scheme as considered in this paper and [4], [5], [6] for more
general settings. A precursor of the work presented here is [7]
where a parametric form of demand function was obtained.
In [8], the tradeoff between retail profit and consumer surplus
was characterized under a Stackelberg formulation with known
demand functions.
The general problem of online learning for dynamic pricing
has been studied extensively in multiple communities. This
problem can be formulated as a multi-armed bandit (MAB)
problem by treating each possible price as an arm. When the
price can only take finite possible values, the problem becomes
the classic MAB for which Lai and Robbins showed that the
optimal regret growth rate is Θ(logT ) when the arms generate
independent reward [9]. When the price takes value from an
uncountable set, the dynamic pricing problem is an example of
the so-called continuum-armed bandit introduced by Agrawal
in [10] where the arms form a compact subset of R. An online
learning policy with regret order of O(T 3/4) was proposed in
[10] for any reward function satisfying Lipschitz continuity.
Further development on the continuum-armed bandit under
various assumptions of the unknown reward function can be
found in [11], [12], [13]. The reason that PWLSA proposed
in this paper achieves a much better regret order (Θ(logT ))
than in the case of a general continuum-armed bandit is due
to the specific linearly parameterized demand which leads to a
specific quadratic cost/reward function. A similar message can
be found in [14], [15], [16], [17], [18] where different regret
orders were shown to be achievable under different classes of
demand models for dynamic pricing.
The problem considered in this paper deals with linearly
parameterized demand functions, thanks to the closed-form
characterization of the optimized demand function for thermal
dynamic load obtained in [8]. The learning approach proposed
in this paper is rooted from a stochastic approximation prob-
lem originally formulated by Lai and Robbins [19], [20] where
the authors considered a form of optimal control problem
when the model contains unknown parameters and the cost
of control is explicitly modeled. For scaler models, Lai and
Robbins showed in [19], [20] that the cumulative regret (if
translated from our definition) of a simple linear stochastic
approximation scheme grows at the rate of O(log T ). However,
it is not clear whether such growth rate is the lowest possible.
Our result provides a generalization to the vector case with a
lower bound for general policies. In addition, our approach
also allows the consumers to have variable demand levels
whereas the algorithm presented in [19], [20] only allows a
single constant demand target.
Also related is the work of Bertsimas and Perakis [21] who
tackled the problem as a dynamic program with incomplete
state information. The authors showed in numerical simula-
tions that considerable gain can be realized over the myopic
policy where the price in the next stage is based on the least
squares estimate of the model parameter. When the parameters
are assumed to be random, Lobo and Boyd considered the
same problem under a Bayesian setting [22] and proposed a
randomized policy via a dithering mechanism. In both cases,
the rate of learning is not characterized.
Machine learning techniques have been applied to pricing
problems in electricity markets, although there seems to be
limited literature on discovering real-time price with unknown
demand functions at the retail level. While such problems can
be viewed as part of the general learning problem discussed
above, the nature of electricity market and electricity demand
impose special constraints. When the market has multiple
strategic generators, Garcia et al. proposed an online learning
algorithm which converges to the Markov perfect equilibria
[23]. A related learning problem of bidding strategy of a
retailer in the wholesale market when the supply functions
of the generators are unknown has been studied. See [24],
[25], [26] where Q-learning techniques have been applied.
Some other research focuses on developing learning methods
for optimal demand response. See [27] for index policy by
formulating the demand control as a restless bandit problem,
and [28] for a reinforcement learning solution to a partially
observable Markov decision process (MDP) problem.
II. STRUCTURE OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET
In this section, we discuss a two-settlement system stylized
from the deregulated wholesale market in the United States.
The market consists of a day-ahead market and a real-time
market. The day-ahead market serves as a planning mechanism
for participants, and its settlement is financially binding. In
the presence of uncertainties, the real-time market, on the
other hand, addresses mismatches between the actual gener-
ation/consumption and that planned in the day-ahead market.
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In the following discussion, we only consider the presence of
retailers and generators, without other financial participants,
such as virtual bidders.
As a participant in the two-settlement market, a retailer
faces uncertainties in the wholesale market and that from
the real-time consumptions of its customers. If the quantity
of consumption is large, the retailer is not a price taker.
Instead, its bidding curve and real-time purchase will affect
the wholesale price. Using a simplified model, we argue
in this section that it is to the retailer’s benefit to match
the real time consumption with the day-ahead dispatched
value. In particular, we motivate, by algebraic and economic
arguments, that minimizing the 2-norm deviation of the real-
time consumption maximizes the retail surplus. This result
motivates the specific form of the cost used in the regret
definition in our online learning formulation of the problem.
A. The day-ahead wholesale market
In the day-ahead market, the independent system operator
(ISO) schedules energy dispatch for the next day. Each elec-
tricity generator submits a cost curve c(p) that represents the
cost of serving p units of electricity, while each retailer (or
Load Serving Entity (LSE)) submits a utility curve u(d) that
models the benefit of getting served with d units of electricity.
Usually, the day-ahead market dispatch is calculated at the
hourly time scale. Therefore, both the demand schedule d and
the generation schedule p are 24 dimensional vectors.
With all submitted offers and bids, the ISO solves an optimal
power flow (OPF) problem to obtain the optimal dispatch
under the objective of maximizing the social welfare. In its
simplest form without complications of capacity constrained
transmission networks and multiple participating agents, the
OPF problem is of the following form,
maxd,p u(d)− c(p)
s.t. d = p
(1)
The solutions, dDA and pDA, represent the desired day-ahead
dispatch of demand and generation. The day-head price is
defined as the cost of serving next unit of energy. Therefore,
it is the marginal cost of generating pDA, i .e., λDA = ∂c∂p (p
DA).
The clearing of the day-ahead market is financially binding
in the sense that, regardless of the actual consumption in
real time, the day-ahead payment from retailer to the system
operator is settled as (λDA)TdDA. The payment from the system
operator to the generator is (λDA)TpDA. Since the retailer’s utility
of using dDA is u(dDA), the retail surplus is
SDA
retail = u(d
DA)− (λDA)TdDA. (2)
B. The real-time wholesale market
The actual consumption and generation in real time dRT
and pRT, however, are nominally different from the day ahead
dispatch. Consequently, the real-time price will deviate from
the day-ahead price. In particular, if the cost function of
generation in real-time is c˜(p), the real-time price is calculated
as λRT = ∂c˜∂p (d
RT), which stands for the cost of serving the next
unit of electricity in real time.
Different from the day-ahead settlement, the real-time
settlement only applies to the difference between the day-
ahead schedule and the real-time consumption. This means
that the payment from the retailer to the system operator is
(λRT)T(dRT−dDA) if positive. Otherwise, this quantity represents
the compensation from the system operator to the retailer.
Therefore, if the real-time consumption matches the day-
ahead dispatch, there is no real-time payment. The total retail
surplus is still SDA
retail. If the actual consumption dRT is different
from dDA, the retail surplus is
SRT
retail = u(d
RT)− [(λDA)TdDA + (λRT)T(dRT − dDA)], (3)
where the first term is the utility of the retailer from delivering
dRT to its consumer, and the second term is the total payment
to the wholesale market. Therefore, the surplus loss due to
deviation of dRT from dDA is
∆Sretail = S
DA
retail − S
RT
retail. (4)
Based on the Taylor expansion of u(dRT), we can approxi-
mate ∆Sretail as shown in the following lemma. The complete
proof is included in the Appendix.
Lemma 1: Under the assumption that cost c(p) and utility
u(d) are twice differentiable,
∆Sretail ≈ θ(d
RT − dDA)T(dRT − dDA), (5)
where θ is a constant independent of dRT and dDA
Therefore, the objective of maximizing retail surplus is
equivalent to minimizing the squared deviation of the real-
time demand to the day-ahead dispatch.
The result above can also be illustrated in the Price-Quantity
plane as shown in Fig. 1. The demand function presents the
optimal quantity of energy required from the retailer given the
price. It is actually the derivative of the utility function u(d).
The area below the line is the integration, which is exactly
the utility value with quantity d. Similarly, the day-ahead and
real-time supply function stand for the optimal quantity of
generation to the generator if the price is given. The crossing
point (dDA, λDA) is the day-ahead equilibrium, the same as
calculated from (1). Subtracting the day-ahead payment from
the utility, Area I represents the day-ahead retail surplus.
λ
DA
λ
RT
d
DA
d
RT
price
Quantity
Area I
Area II
Area III
real-time supply function
day-ahead supply function
demand function
Fig. 1: Real-time market equilibrium
In the real-time market, the real-time consumption dRT
deviates from dDA, and the real-time price, λRT, is determined
by the real-time supply function. Area III is the additional
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utility gained by consuming dRT, while the sum of area II and
III is the real time payment. Therefore, Area II represents
the retail surplus loss, and the loss grows in the order of
||dRT − dDA||22—the 2-norm deviation between the day-ahead
scheduled consumption and the actual real-time consumption.
III. PRICE RESPONSIVE DEMAND
In this section, we characterize the behavior of the con-
sumers in a demand response program offered by a retailer that
uses dynamic price to influence consumptions of its customers.
To this end, the retailer is particularly interested in parametric
models of the demand function that captures the relation
between price of electricity and the level of consumption.
Instead of assuming a particular model, we consider an
important engineering application for HVAC units∗ based
temperature control, since it makes up most price responsive
demand [29]. We establish in this section that the optimal
demand response under the day ahead dynamic pricing is has
an affine parametric form.
A. Day-ahead dynamic pricing
Following the conclusion in Section II, the retailer’s optimal
strategy is to minimize the difference between the real-time
demand and the day-ahead dispatch. In this paper, we assume
that the retailer is to influence the aggregated consumption
of its customers via retail pricing. Specifically, we consider a
specific form of dynamic pricing, Day-Ahead Dynamic Pricing
(DADP), also referred to as Real-Time Pricing (RTP) by
Borenstein et al. [1].
DADP works in the following way. In the day-ahead market,
the retailer offers the consumer hourly retail price π for the
day ahead, according to the prediction of the wholesale market
and projected demand response. In real time, knowing the
entire price trajectory for the day, a consumer dynamically
determines her own energy consumption. The payment from a
consumer to the retailer is settled as the product of day-ahead
price and real-time consumption. The retailer meets aggregated
demand by purchasing electricity from the wholesale market.
B. Optimal demand respose
Given DADP posted one day ahead, the consumer optimizes
her energy consumption. Here we assume a general linear dy-
namic model that captures the relation between the consumer
utility and her consumption of electricity. This general model
arises from the classical model for HVAC based temperature
control where thermal storage is involved [29], [30] and is
shown to be reasonably accurate for residential temperature
control [31].
For consumer k, let x(k) = (x(k)1 , ..., x
(k)
24 ) and a =
(a1, ..., a24) denote the average indoor temperature and out-
door temperature in each hour, respectively. The Birdwell
model of HVAC is given by
x
(k)
i = x
(k)
i−1 + α
(k)(ai − x
(k)
i−1)− β
(k)uki + ξ
(k)
i , (6)
∗Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning units
where u(k) = (u(k)1 , ..., u
(k)
24 ) is the vector of control variable
representing the total amount of electricity drawn by the
HVAC unit during each hour and ξ(k) = (ξ(k)1 , ..., ξ
(k)
24 ) the
process noise. System parameters α(k) (0 < α < 1) and
β(k) model the insolation of the building and the efficiency
of the HVAC unit in consumer k’s house. Note that the
above equation applies to both heating and cooling scenarios
but not simultaneously. We focus herein the cooling scenario
(β(k) > 0) and the results apply to heating (β(k) < 0) as well.
Using a linear combination of total cost and squared de-
viation of indoor temperature from desired temperature as
the objective function to minimize, the consumer k’s energy
consumption can be modeled by the following stochastic
optimization problem,
min E
{∑24
i=1[κ(x
(k)
i − ξ
(k)
i )
2] + πTu(k)
}
s.t. x(k)i = x
(k)
i−1 + α
(k)(ai − x
(k)
i−1)− β
(k)u
(k)
i + ξ
(k)
i ,
y
(k)
i = (x
(k)
i , ai) + ν
(k)
i , (7)
where y(k) = (y(k)1 , ..., y
(k)
24 ) is the observation vector, ν(k) =
(ν
(k)
1 , ..., ν
(k)
24 ) the observation noise vector, κ the weight factor
and ξi the desired temperature for hour i.
The solution of the above stochastic optimization can be
obtained in closed form via direct backward induction. More
significantly, it is shown in [8] that, after aggregation over all
consumers, the total demand is an affine function of the retail
price.
Theorem 1 ([8]): Assume that the process noise ξ(k) and
ν(k) are Gaussian distributed with zero mean for each con-
sumer k. With the fixed retail price π, the optimal aggregated
residential demand response has the following matrix form and
properties,
dRT =
∑
k
u(k) = b−Aπ + w, (8)
where the factor matrix A is positive definite, b and A
are deterministic, depending only on the dynamic system
parameters, and w is a random vector with zero mean.
IV. DYNAMIC RETAIL PRICING VIA ONLINE LEARNING
A. Pricing policy and regret
As discussed in Section II, minimizing the demand side
surplus loss is equivalent, approximately, to minimizing the
squared deviation of real-time electricity consumption, dRT,
from the day-ahead optimal dispatch, dDA.
Formally, define the t-th day’s expected surplus loss as the
2-norm of the deviation of the real-time consumption from the
day-ahead dispatch, i .e., Lt
∆
=E[||dRTt −d
DA
t ||
2
2], where dDAt and
dRTt are the day-ahead and real-time demands for day t.
Assuming the linear demand function in Theorem 1, for the
purpose of obtaining a performance upper bound, we consider
the case that the parameters in (8), A and b, are known to the
retailer. At day t, the optimal retail price is given by
π∗t = argmin
pit
E[||dRTt − d
DA
t ||
2
2] = A
−1(b− dDAt ), (9)
and the corresponding minimum surplus loss is only caused
by the exogenous random fluctuations (such as the outdoor
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temperature). Specifically, the minimized expected loss is
E[||b−Aπ∗t + wt − d
DA
t ||
2
2] = ||Σw||2, (10)
where Σw is the covariance matrix of demand model noise w
in (8). Notice that the minimized surplus loss is independent
of the day-ahead dispatch dDAt .
However, it is nontrivial for the retailer to obtain the exact
parameters of the demand functions of its customers because a
customer is likely to consider such information private. At day
t, the only information available to the retailer is the record
of previous electricity consumption up to t− 1 and day-ahead
dispatch up to t. Formally, the retail pricing policy is defined
as follows,
Definition 1: The retail pricing policy µ = (µt) is a
sequence of mappings where µt maps the consumption history
and day-ahead demand dispatch to the price vector of day t.
In particular, letting πµt be the price vector under policy µ, we
have
πµt = µt(d
RT
0 , ..., d
RT
t−1, d
DA
0 , ..., d
DA
t−1, d
DA
t ), (11)
where dDAi , and dRTi are the day-ahead dispatch and real-time
electricity consumption for day i. 
As for a particular policy µ, the regret Rµt at day t is defined
as the increase of surplus loss compared with using the optimal
price, π∗t , which means that
Rµt
∆
=E[||b −Aπµt + wt − d
DA
t ||
2
2 − ||Σw||2]
= E[||b −Aπµt − d
DA
t ||
2
2].
(12)
Because maximizing the surplus is equivalent to minimizing
the regret, we’ll focus next on the increasing rate of the
cumulative regret up to day T ,
∑T
t=1R
µ
t .
B. Lower bound on the growth rate of regret
To gain insights into the type of lower bound on the regret,
we consider first a simple example when part of the parameters
are known. Intuitively, the advantage of knowing partially the
parameters should lead to a lower growth rate of regret.
In particular, recall the stochastic affine demand function (8)
where we assume parameter A is known but b is unknown.
Consider the following dynamic pricing policy, µ˜, given by
πµ˜t = π¯t−1 +A
−1(d¯RTt−1 − d
DA
t ), (13)
where π¯t−1 and d¯t−1 are the average price and demand up to
day t− 1, i .e.,
π¯t−1 =
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
πi and, d¯RTt−1 =
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
dRTi . (14)
According to (12), straight forward calculation gives that the
regret for day t is
Rµ˜t = E[||
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
wi||
2
2] =
1
t
||Σw||2. (15)
Therefore, the aggregated regret,
T∑
t=1
Rµ˜t =
T∑
t=1
1
t
||Σw||2 ≤ (1 + logT )||Σw||2 (16)
Therefore, with the knowledge of the demand function
parameter A, the policy µ˜ achieves the aggregated regret
O(log T ) for any b and any arbitrary sequence of {dDAt }.
To establish the actual lower bound on the growth rate of
regret, we formulate a game that, after the retailer proposes
a deterministic pricing policy µ, there exists an adversary
designing parameters of the demand function. The adversary
is to create the worst loss to the retailer while the retailer
tries to minimize the largest possible loss. In other words, we
consider the following the min-max regret as the objective,
min
µ
max
b,A
T∑
t=1
Rµt .
The following theorem shows that in the min-max sense,
the growing rate of the cumulative regret can not be lower
than logT .
Theorem 2: For any pricing policy µ as defined in (11), there
exist some (A, b, dDA0 , ..., dDAt−1, dDAt , ...) to make the cumulative
regret,
∑T
t=1R
µ
t , grows at least at the rate of logT .
Proof: see the Appendix.
C. PWLSA: a rate optimal learning policy
In this section, we propose a policy that achieves the
lower bound on the regret growth rate; it is thus optimal
in the sense of having the lowest rate of growth. Referred
to as piecewise linear stochastic approximation (PWLSA)
policy, the proposed policy is an extension of the stochastic
approximation approach of Lai and Robin [20] for scaler
processes with a single desired optimal price.
If the day-ahead demand is the same for all days, stochastic
approximation will use the previous average price as the
nominal value and previous average demand as the feedback
signal to calculate the next price, as shown below,
πSAt = π¯t−1 + γ(d¯
RT
t−1 − d
DA), (17)
where dDA is the constant day-ahead dispatch level, and the
feedback factor γ is a positive scalar.
For multiple day-ahead dispatch levels, we build adaptively
a dictionary of day-ahead dispatch levels that have appeared
before. Denote the dictionary at day t as Dt. For day t+1, if
dDAt+1 ∈ Dt, let Dt+1 = Dt. Otherwise, Dt+1 = Dt
⋃
{dDAt+1}.
For each day-ahead dispatch level in D =
⋃
∞
t=1Dt, we keep a
separate stochastic approximation to calculate the retail price,
in a feedback control fashion similar as (17).
Therefore, for different dDAt , we have a different linear func-
tion to calculate the next retail price. The policy is piecewise
linear. Formally, the PWLSA policy, µPWLSA, is defined as,
Definition 2 (PWLSA): Assume for all t ∈ N+, dDAt ∈ D
and D is countable.
• If dDAt ∈ Dt, then Dt+1 = Dt and
πPWLSAt =
1
|C
dDA
t
t |


∑
k∈C
dDA
t
πPWLSAk + γ(d
PWLSA
k − d
DA
t )

 ,
(18)
where Cd
DA
t
t = {k ∈ N
+ : k ≤ t − 1, dDAk = d
DA
t } and
|C
dDA
t
t | is the total number of elements in C
dDA
t
t .
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• Otherwise, dDAt /∈ Dt, then Dt+1 = Dt
⋃
{dDAt } and
πPWLSAt = π˜j , (19)
where π˜j is an arbitrary predetermined price.

The following theorem shows that PWLSA can achieve the
optimal logarithmic regret order.
Theorem 3: Assume that day-ahead dispatch dDAt ’s are from
a finite set, i .e., |D| <∞. If γ ≥ 12λmin(A) , where λmin(A)
is the minimum eigenvalue of A, then we have,
T∑
t=1
Rµ
PWLSA
t ∼ O(log(T )), (20)
Proof: see the Appendix.
Since logT is shown to be the optimal rate achievable,
PWLSA is already the best in the sense of asymptotic growing
rate of the regret. The conditions in the theorem are quite
general. In practice, the cost functions from the generator and
the utility functions from the retailer won’t change often and
are usually chosen from a few alternatives. Therefore, we can
assume the total number of possible day-ahead dispatch levels,
|D|, to be finite. On the other hand, the consumers’ demand
function is from real data, which can be constrained by a
compact set. Therefore, the bound of the minimum eigenvalue
of A is not hard to get with reasonable assumption.
V. SIMULATION
A. Simulation set-up
In this section, we conducted simulations based on the
actual temperature records in Hartford, CT, from July 1st, 2012
to July 30th, 2012. The day-head price was also for the same
period from ISO New England. The HVAC parameters for the
simulation were set as: α = 0.5, β = 1, µ = 10. The desired
indoor temperature was set to be 18◦C for all hours. The size
of aggregation was assumed to be 100.
B. Learning static parameters
First, we examined PWLSA’s ability to identify the correct
price if the parameters of the demand model remain the same.
To make the comparison, we used the Greedy Method [32],
[22] as a benchmark. At each day, the Greedy Method makes
maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters and uses the
result as the correct parameters to calculate the “optimal”
price.
Fig. 2 shows the average performance of PWLSA and
Greedy Method over 10,000 Monte Carlo runs. In Fig. 2a, the
induced cumulative regrets of the two policies are compared.
We could identify the logarithmic growth of the cumulative re-
gret under PWLSA and significant cumulative regret increase
by the Greedy Method. Fig. 2b shows the absolute percentage
deviation of the prices under the two polices from the optimal
price. We can see that Greedy Method performed extremely
bad at the very beginning due to insufficient learning. After
some days, the two policies both produced prices pretty close
to the optimal one.
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Fig. 2: Average performance comparison of PWLSA
and the Greedy Method
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Fig. 3: Scenario analysis of PWLSA and Greedy
Method under static parameters
After carefully investigating the simulated data, we found
two typical scenarios as shown in Fig. 3. We used the ratio
of the calculated price to the optimal price as y-axis, to show
the fluctuation. In most of the cases as in Fig. 3a, the two
polices gave similar performance and both converged to the
optimal price fast. On the other hand, Fig. 3b shows one
extreme scenario that Greedy Method run into the condition
that is close to singularity, which leads to an abnormal price.
Although this kind of scenarios happened rarely, it caused
the wide performance gap between the Greedy Method and
PWLSA.
C. Learning dynamic parameters
In the real world, the parameters of the demand model
usually do not stay constant. They may follow some cycles
or drifts. In this subsection, we tested the learning ability and
robustness of PWLSA under dynamic unknown parameters.
Besides the set of parameters above, we used 1.5A instead of
A to make the alternative set of parameters. We assumed the
parameters followed a Markov Chain with these two sets as
states. The transition probability to the other set was assumed
to be 0.25.
Fig. 4 shows the average performance comparison of
PWLSA and the Greedy Method under dynamic unknown
demand model. We can see that PWLSA still outperformed the
Greedy Method. According to Fig. 4a, the cumulative regret
under PWLSA grew linearly. Intuitively, when a sequence
of observation is given, a policy will produce a fixed price
or a fixed probability distribution over candidate prices (for
randomized policy). However, since the next optimal price is
random, there always exists a fixed addition to the expected
cumulative regret. Therefore, the linear order achieved by
PWLSA is already the best. Fig. 4b shows that the error at the
very beginning was the cause of the performance gap between
PWLSA and the Greedy Method.
We also conducted the scenario analysis similar to the static
parameter case as shown in Fig. 5. Each changing point stands
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Fig. 4: Average performance comparison of PWLSA
and Greedy Method under dynamic unknown
demand model, 10,000 Monte Carlo runs
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Fig. 5: Scenario analysis of PWLSA and Greedy
Method under dynamic parameters
for a incident that the state jumps to the other set. In Fig. 5a,
we can see that the two policies had similar performance and
both tracked the optimal prices well. In few extreme cases,
the Greedy Method lost track on the optimal prices wildly at
the beginning a few days, as shown in Fig. 5b.
VI. CONCLUSION
We present in this paper an online learning approach to the
dynamic pricing of electricity of a retailer whose customers
have price responsive dynamic load with unknown demand
function. We exploit the linear form of the demand function
for thermal dynamic load, and cast the problem of online
learning as tracking day-ahead dispatch. This approach leads to
a simple learning algorithm with the growth rate of cumulative
regret at the order of logT , which is the best rate achievable
for any dynamic pricing policies.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the first order approximation,
u(dRT)− u(dDA) ≈ [
∂u
∂d
(dDA)]T(dRT − dDA). (21)
By the KKT condition and the definition of real-time price
∂u
∂d
(dDA) =
∂c
∂p
(pDA) =
∂c
∂p
(dDA). (22)
λRT =
∂c˜
∂p
(pRT) =
∂c˜
∂p
(dRT) =
∂c
∂p
(dRT) +
∂∆c
∂p
(dRT), (23)
where ∆c(p) = c˜(p) − c(p). As the generation cost function,
c(p) usually takes a quadratic form in practice, i .e., , c(p) =
θpTp, where θ is a scalar. Therefore,
∆Sretail ≈ θ(d
RT − dDA)T(dRT − dDA) + (
∂∆c
∂p
(dRT))T(dRT − dDA).
(24)
Usually, the day-ahead cost function c(p) and real-time cost
function c˜(p) have similar shapes and the perturbation ∆c has
small first order derivative. Hence, compared with the first
term in (24), the second term can be neglected.
∆Sretail ≈ θ(d
RT − dDA)T(dRT − dDA). (25)

Proof of Theorem 2
First, we reduce the problem to the case that A is known,
dDAi ’s are constant and Σw is a diagonal matrix with the
diagonal elements all as σ2w. The minimax rate for this case
lower bounds the general case.
For any policy µ, the maximum regret among all possible
b is
L(µ) = max
b
T∑
t=1
Rµt . (26)
Assume the parameter b follows a prior distribution,γn :
N(b¯, nσ2I), where n is a positive integer number and I is an
identity matrix. Define the Bayesian cost as (12) and denote
the Bayesian estimator of b as ηn. By the property of joint
Gaussian distribution and Sherman-Morrison formula, we can
get the minimum Bayesian risk,
Rηnt (γn) = E
ηn ||b− ηn(d
RT
1 , ..., d
RT
t−1)||
2
2 =
nσ2
σ2w + tnσ
2
||Σw||2
Then, the cumulative Bayesian risk
∑T
t=1R
Bayes
t (γn) is an
increasing function of n and goes to L(µ˜) =
∑T
t=1
1
t ||Σw||2
as n goes to ∞, where µ˜ is defined in Eq. (13).
If µ˜ is not the minimax estimator, there exist some policy
µ¯ and ǫ > 0, s.t. L(µ¯) < L(µ˜) − ǫ. On the other hand, for
ǫ > 0, we can find some positive integer m, s.t.
L(µ˜)− ǫ <
T∑
t=1
Rηmt (γm).
By the definition (26), the Bayesian risk of policy µ¯ under
the distribution γm should be less than the maximum cost over
all possible values of b, i .e.,
T∑
t=1
Rµ¯t (γm) < L(µ¯) < L(µ˜)− ǫ <
T∑
t=1
Rηmt (γm),
which contradicts the fact that ηm is the Bayesian estimator.

Proof of Theorem 3
First, we consider when there is a single day-ahead dispatch
level dDA, and π∗ = A−1(b− dDA). After simplification,
πn+1 − π
∗
n+1
= (I − γA)[Πn−1i=1 (1 −
γA
i+1 )](π1 − π
∗)
+
∑n
k=1{
γ
n +
∑n−1
j=k [Π
n−1
i=j+1(I −
γA
i+1 )]
(I−γA)γ
j(j+1) }ωk.
(27)
For the first term in (27),
||(I−γA)[Πn−1i=1 (1−
γA
i+ 1
)]||22 ≤ ||(I−γA)||
2
2Π
n−1
i=1 ||(I−
γA
i+ 1
)||22.
Since (I − γAi+1 )
T(1− γAi+1 ) = I −
2γA
i+1 +
γ2A2
(i+1)2 , denoting λm
as the minimum eigenvalue of A, we have,
||(I −
γA
i+ 1
)||22 ≤ I −
2γλm
i+ 1
+
γ2
(i + 1)2
||A||22.
Let C1
∆
=||I − γA||22. Then, since γλm > 12
||(I − γA)[Πn−1i=1 (I −
γA
i+1 )]||
2
2
≤ C1Π
n−1
i=1 (I −
2γλm
i+1 +
γ2
(i+1)2 ||A||
2
2) = C2
1
n+1 ,
where C2 = C1exp{γ2||A||22} doesn’t depend on n.
For the second term in (27),
||[Πn−1i=j+1(I −
γA
i+1 )](I − γA)||
2
2
≤ C1exp{
∑n
i=j+1 −
2γλm
i+1 +
γ2
(i+1)2 ||A||
2
2} ≤ C2(
j+1
n+1 )
2γλm .
Then,
|| γn +
∑n−1
j=k [Π
n−1
i=j+1(I −
γA
i+1 )]
(1−γA)γ
j(j+1) ||
2
2
≤ { γn +
∑n−1
j=k ||[Π
n−1
i=j+1(I −
γA
i+1 )](I − γA)||2
γ
j(j+1)}
2
≤ 2 γ
2
n2 + 2γC2(
1
n )(
1
n )
2γλm−1( 1k )
2−2γλm .
Sum the two terms up,
∑n−1
k=1 ||
γ
n +
∑n−1
j=k [Π
n−1
i=j+1(I −
γA
i+1 )]
(1−γA)γ
j(j+1) ||
2
2
≤ 2 γ
2
n + 2γC2(
1
n )(
1
n )
2γλm−1
∑n−1
k=1 (
1
k )
2−2γλm ≤ C3
1
n .
Define M = max{||π1 − π∗||22, ||Σω||22, ||Σd||22}, we have∑n
i=1 Ln = E
∑n
i=1 ||A(πi − π
∗)||22
≤
∑T
n=1 ||A||
2
2[(C2 + C1)
1
n ]M ≤ C log(T ).
If |D| is finite, and we use a separate stochastic approxima-
tion to calculate the retail price, then the accumulated regret∑T
n=1Rn ≤ C|D| log(T ). 
